What is Jones Act seaman status?
In a Jones Act case, the determination of seaman status is a mixed question of law and fact. Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 117 S.Ct. 1535, 137 L.Ed.2d 800 (1997).
The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688(a), mandates that "[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law...." While the Act affords an injured seaman the right to maintain an action, it is silent as to the definition of "seaman." The Act "therefore leaves to the courts the determination of exactly which maritime workers are entitled to admiralty's special protection." Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 355, 115 S.Ct. 2172, 2183, 132 L.Ed.2d 314 (1995).
The courts hold that the burden of proving the elements of a twofold, conjunctive test for seaman status. First, ... 'an employee's duties must "contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission.' " ... Second, ... a seaman must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature." Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368, 115 S.Ct. at 2190 (citation omitted); Roberts v. Cardinal Services, 266 F.3d 368, 374 (5th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 954, 122 S.Ct. 1357, 152 L.Ed.2d 353 (2002).
The first prong of this fact-intensive test is a broad threshold inquiry. Typically, it is easily satisfied, and a maritime employee who does the ship's work falls within the purview of the Jones Act. Indeed, "[a]ll who work at sea in the service of a ship" are potential seamen. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368, 115 S.Ct. at 2190 (quoting McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 354, 111 S.Ct. 807, 817, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991)). See also, Hufnagel v. Omega Serv. Indus., Inc., 182 F.3d 340, 347 (5th Cir.1999). It is neither necessary for the maritime worker to aid in navigation nor to participate in actual transportation of the vessel in order to satisfy the first prong. Little v. Amoco Prod. Co., 98-1130 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/14/99), 734 So.2d 933, writ denied, 99-1752 (La.10/1/99), 748 So.2d 446; Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 111 S.Ct. 807, 112 L.Ed.2d 866.
The second or "substantial connection" prong of the test is often the determinative one. It consists of both temporal and functional elements, which is to say that the focus is on the substantiality of the connection to a vessel or identifiable group of vessels. The connection must be substantial in terms of both duration and nature. The Supreme Court in Chandris stated that "[a] maritime worker who spends only a small fraction of his working time on board a vessel is fundamentally land-based and therefore not a member of the vessel's crew, regardless of what his duties are." Chandris, 515 U.S. at 371, 115 S.Ct. at 2191. The Court went on to state: "A worker who spends less than about 30 percent of his time in the service of a vessel in navigation should not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act. This figure of course serves as no more than a guideline established by years of experience, and departure from it will certainly be justified in appropriate cases.... And where undisputed facts reveal that a maritime worker has a clearly inadequate temporal connection to vessels in navigation, the court may take the question from the jury by granting summary judgment or a directed verdict. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 371, 115 S.Ct. at 2191.
What is Vessel Status?
In Stewart v. Dutra Const. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 125 S.Ct. 1118, 160 L.Ed.2d 932 (2005), the Supreme Court adopted 1 U.S.C. § 3 as the standard for deciding if an object that floats is a "vessel." Section 3 states that, "The word ‘vessel’ includes every description of water craft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water."
This case involved a dredge Super Scoop — a large floating platform equipped with a clamshell bucket to remove silt from the ocean floor — to dig a large trench beneath the Boston Harbor to prepare for the Ted Williams tunnel. It had a captain & crew, navigational lights, ballast tanks, & a crew dining room. It had no self-propulsion but could navigate short distances by manipulating its anchors & cables. It usually moved 30-50' every two hours or so. Dutra employed Plaintiff as a marine engineer to maintain the mechanical systems on the dredge, which used it bucket to move the scows. When injured plaintiff was on the scow while the bucket was moving it & when hurt when the scow collided with the dredge, causing him to fall into the hatch. He sued under the Jones Act & alternatively under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). Under either theory, plaintiff had to prove that the dredge was a "vessel." The district court granted defendant’s summary-judgment motion that this was not a vessel within the meaning of the Jones Act, finding that its primary purpose was dredging, not transportation, & so plaintiff was not a Jones Act seaman. The circuit court affirmed. On remand, the district court granted defendant’s summary-judgment motion on the 905(b) claim holding that defendant was liable as owner of a "vessel" & the appellate court affirmed — both courts found that "vessel" is broader definition under LHWCA. While a vessel under 905(b), both lower courts found that defendant was liable as plaintiff’s employer rather than as owner of the vessel under 905(b).
First, the court rejected the argument that "vessel" means something different under the Jones Act & LHWCA & that the def in 1 U.S.C. § 3 applies in both situations.
Second, the Court rejected the appellate court’s test that treated a craft differently depending upon whether its primary purpose was for transportation or another purpose, again using 1 U.S.C. § 3.
Third, the Court rejected the argument that as to certain kinds of craft had to be in motion at the time of the accident to qualify under the Jones Act as a vessel, again turning to 1 U.S.C. § 3, and noting that looking at whether or not a vessel is or isn’t is motion is sort of a "snapshot" test that Court rejected in Chandris, 515 U.S. at 363, 115 S.Ct. At 2172, and Stewart, 125 S.Ct. 1128. The Court made clear that the "in-navigation" language used in Chandris was never intended to indicate that a structure’s locomotion at any given moment mattered. Stewart, 125 S.Ct. 1128. Thus, whether a craft is a "vessel in navigation" depends on whether it is "capable of being used" for maritime transport. Id. at 125 S.Ct. 1127.
The decision also makes clear that the workers’ legal remedies are indistinguishable from those blue wather seamen who serve as seamen on traditional vessels. The Court noted that the broad principles underlying maritime law ". . . adapt themselves to all the new kinds of property and new sets of operatives and new conditions which are brought into existence in the progress of the world." Id. at 1129.
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